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Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner, (OSI), by and through its counsel, hereby
responds to the answering brief of the Utah State Tax Commission
(Commission) in regard to the Commission's arguments that the
Commission has a statutory grant of interpretive discretion to
deny the benefit of the sales and use tax exemption (20) for
sprays to OSI, even though OSI is indisputably using a liquid
nitrogen spray to control diseases for the commercial production
of meat patties, an animal product.

However, it will be shown

herein that to arrive at its conclusion, the Commission has
wholly ignored certain relevant discussions in and the holdings
of applicable cases, has omitted material and controlling facts,
and has distorted the wording of exemption (20).

1

EXEMPTION PROVISION (20)
The sales and use tax exemption (20) at issue herein states
as follows:
§59-12-104.

Exemptions.

The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes
imposed by this chapter:
. . .

(20) spravs and insecticides used to control insects,
diseases, and weeds for commercial production of fruits,
vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal products; (Underlining
added.)
. . .

THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENTS
The Commission's brief principally relies on two arguments
to deny the benefit to OSI of the sales tax exemption (20) for
sprays used in commercial production of animal products as
follows:
(1)

The Commission had express or implied

interpretive discretion granted by the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, (UAPA) , Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to 22, and by
one provision of the Sales and Use Tax Act, (SUTA) , Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-118, to determine the meaning of the exemption for
sprays under an "abuse of discretion" standard and not a
"correction of error" standard as relied on by OSI; and
(2)

The Commission properly used such discretionary

interpretive power to limit the exemption for sprays used in the
commercial production of animal products to pesticides and
2

herbicides utilized during the "growing end" period of
agricultural production.
It will be shown herein that the Commissions
arguments do not accurately state the law and fail to consider
controlling facts.
OSI'S REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

THERE HAS BEEN NO GRANT OF INTERPRETIVE DISCRETION TO

THE COMMISSION IN REFERENCE TO THE EXEMPTION FOR SPRAYS.
In regard the Commission's first argument that it was
granted statuary interpretive discretion by UAPA and the SUTA to
limit exemption (20) to sprays used during the "growing end" in
traditional agricultural production, the Commission cites the
SUTA section 59-12-118, as being the grant of such express or
implied interpretive discretion. Also, the Commission relies on
Putvin v. Utah State Tax Commission, 837 P.2d 589 (Utah App.
1992), wherein this court stated that "the legislature has
granted the Commission discretion in administration of the tax
code generally", and the Commission argues that such statement
is confirmation that the Commission has been granted statutory
interpretive discretion.
The Commissions argument essentially has no merit because
the power to administer the SUTA does not automatically include
statutory discretionary interpretive power. In fact, both this
court and the supreme court have repeatedly discussed the scope
of UAPA and the SUTA and neither court has recognized such a
broad discretionary interpretive power as claimed by the
Commission, but instead, has in each case examined and
3

principally relied on the specific wording and statutory context
as well as the legislative history of the particular statutory
provision at issue to determine whether or not a discretionary
grant was expressly or implicitly given to the agency. Even in
Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), relied on
extensively by the Commission in this case, the supreme court
determined whether there was a grant of interpretive discretion
not by the general grant of power to administer the SUTA but on
whether there was a separate explicit or implicit grant of
interpretive deference given to the Commission in the language
of the particular provision or in the statutory context which
undoubtedly includes both the legislative history and a
comparison of the particular exemption with the other exemption
provisions contained in the SUTA.

The legislative history of

exemption (20) which fully supports OSI's claim of exemption is
reviewed and discussed on pages 22-25 of OSI's opening brief.
In a very recent decision by this court, King v. The
Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33,37 (Utah App. 1993)
filed on March 18, 1993, Judge Billings discussed the
application of UAPA to determine the appropriate standard of
review in regard to agency decisions, as follows:
. . . This model applies in all UAPA cases dealing with
either the interpretation or application of agencyspecific law by an agency. First, we determine whether
the legislature explicitly granted deference to the
agency to interpret or apply statutory language at issue.
As Judge Bench has rightly noted, we can find an explicit
grant of deference in specific statutory language
directing the agency to define a statutory term by
regulation. Additionally, a statute directing the agency
4

to interpret or apply specific statutory language should
be interpreted as an explicit grant of discretion. If we
find such a grant, we review under section 63-46b16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. That is, we afford
the agency some deference and assess whether its action
is within the bounds of reasonableness.
Second, if we do not find an explicit grant of
discretion, we examine the language of the statute and
the statutory framework for an implicit grant of
discretion. If the statutory language is broad and
expansive or subject to numerous interpretations we will
assume the legislature has chosen to defer to the policy
making expertise of the agency and we will find an
implicit grant of discretion and review the action under
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. If,
on the other hand, the language is unambiguous and we can
interpret and apply the statutory language by the
traditional methods of statutory construction, utilizing
our own expertise to divine the legislative intent, we
review the agency action under section 63-46b-16(4)(d)
for correction of error. (Footnote omitted.)

In an even more recent decision by the supreme court,
Semeco Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State
Tax Commission. 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 73 (Utah 1993), filed April
1, 1993, Justice Durham, dissenting to the resolution of the
case, also reviewed in general the application of UAPA to
determine the standard of review regarding agency decisions, and
in her discussion she cited many cases involving UAPA. Justice
Durham stated that subsection (4)(d) of UAPA section 63-46b-16
relating to the erroneous interpretation or application of law
by the agency is subject to a correction of error standard, that
subsection (4)(g) relating to fact determination by the agency
but not supported by substantial evidence is subject to an
intermediate deference standard, and that subsection (4)(h)
relating to abuse of discretion or other inconsistent or
arbitrary actions by the agency is subject to a reasonableness
5

and rationality review.

See 209 Utah Adv. Rep. @ 75-78.

Even where there are differing emphases or approaches to
determine the appropriate standard of review in the various
appellate decisions involving UAPA and the SUTA, it is
undisputed that in cases where no explicit grant of discretion
has been given, the controlling factors in every decision are
the wording of the specific exemption provision at issue, its
comparison with other exemption provisions in the SUTA, and its
legislative history.
It is submitted that under the reasoning of the various
cases (also as extensively discussed in OSI's opening brief on
pages 12-14) there has been no statutory interpretive discretion
granted to the Commission in regard to exemption (20) for
sprays.

Therefore, the Commission's final decision in this

case is subject to a correction of error standard under UAPA.
In addition, the Commission ignores undisputed and
stipulated facts regarding OSI's spraying of liquid nitrogen to
control disease carrying bacteria such as E. coli, salmonella
and staphylococcus.

Therefore the Commission's final decision

is at best arbitrary or capricious and is not supported by
substantial evidence, even if it is to be reviewed, as Justice
Durham suggests, only for reasonableness and rationality under
subsection 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) which may possibly be the
appropriate standard where the Commission's decision is for any
reason whatever "otherwise arbitrary or capricious."

See Nos.

15, 18, 21 and 22 of the Facts in OSI's opening brief showing
the relevant items which the Commission has ignored in its
6

argument.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENT THAT IT PROPERLY EMPLOYED

ITS INTERPRETIVE POWER TO LIMIT EXEMPTION (20) ONLY TO
PESTICIDES AND HERBICIDES USED DURING THE "GROWING END" OF
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IS BOTH ILLOGICAL AND NONSENSICAL.
In OSI's opening brief, the association of the words of
exemption (20) and its legislative history were extensively
discussed in an effort to eliminate any doubt as to its fair
application to the liquid nitrogen spray.

However, there was

one aspect of OSI's discussion, relating to the various stages
in the food production chain, which needs to be expanded and
examined in greater detail herein because of the Commission's
argument that its denial of the exemption to OSI is based on
"common sense."
Exemption (20) applies to —
sprays and insecticides used to control insects,
diseases, and weeds for commercial production of
fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal
products: (Underlining added.)
It is clear from the wording of exemption (20) that, at
least for some of the items mentioned therein, there are at
least two stages contemplated therein and both of which are
necessary to complete production of the particular item prior
to consumption by humans.

For example, butter, as an "animal

product", is produced after the milk is separated from the
cow.

Likewise, pasteurization of milk, formulation of ice
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cream, production of leather, fur and wool, as well as meat,
all come into particular form and identity after separation
from or slaughter of the animal.

In addition, it cannot be

disputed that the preparation and production of fruits and
vegetables for ultimate human consumption are often involved
in a second production stage in which canning or freezing is
utilized prior to delivery for public consumption.

The

Commission's argument wrongly ignores the second stage of
production which is implicit in exemption (20).
In fact, it is common knowledge that the second stage in
the meat food chain, involving commercial production, is
almost never performed by farmers, as such, but is almost
exclusively performed by entities such as OSI. Moreover,
because the legislature used the words "commercial production"
in exemption (20) rather than the words "agricultural
production", it may reasonably be concluded that the
legislature placed more weight on the second stage than on the
first stage involving the live animals or plants.

The

Commission's emphasis on the "growing end" is clearly wrong.
As discussed in Point I above, the Commission was not
granted interpretive deference in regard to exemption (20).
Nonetheless, the Commission repeatedly states in its brief
that its argument and final decision denying the exemption to
OSI are based on "common sense", (as defined by the
Commission), and should therefore be adopted by this court.
The Commission urges that exemption (20) is limited to
pesticides and herbicides applied to the "growing end" as
8

distinguished from the "consumption end" of food production.
On page 9 of its brief the Commission states as follows:
Common sense would limit the application of the
exemption to the "growing" end of food production, not
the "consumption" end. Basically, the liquid nitrogen
used by the Petitioner freezes the processed food as hard
as a brick so that it can be stored, shipped, and stored
again before it is finally grilled for a McDonald's
customer. Certainly, no error was committed in finding
this process outside the intentions of the exemption.
It can be easily demonstrated that the Commission's
"growing" versus "consumption" test used to deny the exemption
to OSI is wholly without merit as such test is applied to the
liquid nitrogen spray.

First, it is undisputed that meat is

an animal product as is shown by the discussion of and
reference to the Commission's own rule on page 16 of OSI's
opening brief.

In addition, legal counsel for the Commission

acknowledged to the Commission's hearing officer that the meat
processed by OSI was an animal product. (See Fact No. 22 on
page 9 of OSI's opening brief.)
Second, as a practical matter, meat, as an animal
product, begins its existence no earlier than the time the
live animal is slaughtered, and thus meat cannot logically be
considered as an "animal product" prior to that time.

Third,

it is manifest that beginning at the time of the slaughter of
the whole animal, the "growing end" of production has been
abruptly and fully terminated.

Therefore, the entire

commercial production of meat when it exists as an animal
product only occurs after the "growing end" is over.
Moreover, exemption (20) does not exempt "animals" but only
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exempts "animal products" resulting from "commercial
production."
Fourth, it is apparent that the food chain involving meat
consists of three general stages, i.e., the growing stage of
live animals, the commercial production stage wherein the
particular meat items (such as OSI/s patties) are produced,
and finally the third stage wherein the meat items are
consumed.

It is undisputed that OSI is only operating in the

second or commercial production stage and not in the "consumer
end" stage as argued by the Commission.
Fifth, the key words in exemption (20) are the
"commercial production of . . . animal products."

Because the

commercial production of meat, as an animal product, can only
occur after the live animal is slaughtered, and during the
production of meat patties OSI administers its liquid nitrogen
spray to control diseases, such spray is manifestly within the
exemption.

Thus, the Commission's attempt to distinguish the

"growing end" from the "consumption end" (which "end" is not
even implicitly within the wording of exemption (20)) is at
best meaningless because it ignores the commercial production
stage, the only stage in which OSI is involved.
In addition, the Commission's arguments wholly fail to
consider the undisputed fact that OSI's production of meat
patties is considered by the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) as part of its jurisdiction because OSI is
continually monitored by USDA inspectors.

(See fact No. 14 in

OSI's opening brief and OSI's Laboratory Technician Job
10

Description and HACCP plan, Exhibits 3 and 4, copies of which
are in the Addendum in OSI's opening brief and which are part
of the stipulated facts.)

It should be noted that OSI's HACCP

plan (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point system) was
formulated under the guidelines of USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service and the USDA's National Advisory Committee
on Microbiological Criteria for Foods for the purpose of
lessening or eliminating the threat of diseases to human
consumers which might result from the production of
contaminated food items.
In regard to the Commission's argument that its decision
is supported by the statutory construction rule of noscitur
sociis.

a

that argument does not favor the Commission's

conclusions when the multiple stages implicit in exemption
(20) are considered and in fact ignores the clear differences
between animal products and fruits and vegetables in regard to
"commercial production."

Furthermore, the Commission does not

respond to OSI's analysis of noscitur

a sociis

on page 26 of

OSI's opening brief.
Also in support of its argument that exemption (20)
should be read to limit its application to the "growing end"
of "agricultural production", the Commission cites a case from
Delaware, Burpulis v. Director of Revenue, 498 A.2d 1082 (Del.
1985), which case involved a claimed deduction for a twoearner married couple and which case raised an issue whether a
prior written Delaware tax ruling on such deductions had been
properly enacted.

Although the Burpulis case is clearly
11

inapplicable, the Commission relies on Burpulis for the
argument that a statute should not be literally interpreted if
such interpretation would lead to "unjust and mischievous
consequences", which injustice and mischief, the Commission
implies, would result in this case if OSI were to be exempt
from tax.

The Commission's argument itself appears somewhat

mischievous because exemption (20) does not yield the
interpretation which the Commission argues for without
inappropriately adding to or replacing the exemption's actual
words "commercial production of . . . animal products."
Moreover, the Commission's argument is at best contradictory,
because in substance, the Commission is conceding that the
plain meaning of exemption (20) would result in exempting
OSI's liquid nitrogen spray, but then to avoid that unwelcome
result, the Commission attempts to replace the actual words of
exemption (20) with more restrictive words of the Commission's
own choosing.
The Commission also argues that the liquid nitrogen spray
is only used to prevent "natural decay" or "mere spoilage" and
not "diseases."

The Commission's argument is contrary to

stipulated fact number 18, that the spray is applied to
control disease and disease producing pathogens and to the
fact that OSI's process is monitored by USDA and is used to
control disease carrying bacteria as stated in fact number 21
and verified by exhibits 3 and 4 admitted into evidence.
Additionally, the Commission's counsel conceded that OSI's
spray was used "to control, limit disease."
12

(R. 56)

Moreover, the Commission has attempted to create a
patently false distinction between (a) "an external force such
as infection," and (b) what the Commission characterizes,
without definition, as mere "spoilage" and "natural decay."
In both instances, the identically same process is being
described.

Yet, each of these descriptions by the Commission

employs different words that deceptively characterize that
destructive process so as to give the appearance that a
distinction exists when, in fact, none does. A bacterium,
virus or other microorganism is an "external force" that
invades organic matter and causes the degradation or
destruction of the cells of that matter.

The organic matter,

whether a vegetable, fruit or animal product, provides a
growth medium and food source for the miscroorganism, which
without interruption by an intervening or neutralizing agent,
such as OSI/s liquid nitrogen spray, will grow and spread
until the entire organic matter has been detrimentally
affected.
To the general public, this process may be commonly
described more simply by many names, including disease,
spoilage, the growth of mold or fungus, and infection.
Regardless of the label, however, the same destructive process
is at issue, and such process "implies an external force."
Accordingly, as the Commission does not dispute that E. coli,
staphylococcus and salmonella —

the identified bacteria

guarded against and neutralized or destroyed by OSI's use of
the liquid nitrogen spray —

are "external forces" that cause
13

disease, OSI's liquid nitrogen spray is exempt even under the
Commission's reasoning.
CONCLUSION
Because there is no express or implicit statutory
interpretive discretion granted to the Commission in regard to
exemption (20) for sprays, the Commission's final decision
should be reviewed under a correction of error standard.
It is clear that exemption (20) exempts the commercial
production of meat as an animal product and such production
can only occur during the second stage after separation of the
meat from the whole animal.

It is also clear that OSI is

involved only in the commercial production stage wherein the
liquid nitrogen is sprayed to control diseases.

Thus, OSI's

production of meat patties is indisputably within the clear
wording and intent of exemption (20).
The commission's final decision should be reversed and
the Commission should be ordered to refund to OSI the amount
of taxes, interest and penalty paid together with statutory
j

interest thereon.

Dated this c*T —day of April 1993.

Walter P. Faber, Jr.
Attorney for Petitioner
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